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EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM
OF AGENTS
A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Abstract. We consider exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which
the commodity space is a separable and reﬂexive Banach lattice. Under assumptions imposing
uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equivalence
were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [27] and Podczeck [25]. In this paper we prove that
under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of competitive equilibria
(and thus the core) is non-empty.
1. Introduction
We consider an exchange economy with inﬁnitely many agents and inﬁnitely many commodities.
Inﬁnite dimensional commodity spaces arise very naturally in economics, in particular in problems
involving the allocation of resources over an inﬁnite time horizon (e.g. an `p commodity space) or
uncertainty about the possibly inﬁnite number of states of nature (e.g. an Lp([0,1]) commodity
space). In our model, the commodity space we will be a reﬂexive and separable Banach space. In
the formulation of the Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie model of an exchange economy (Arrow–Debreu [5],
McKenzie [22], Debreu [11]), a ﬁnite number of agents take prices as given. This formulation
raises a conceptual diﬃculty: a ﬁnite number of agents should mean that individuals are able
to exercise some inﬂuence, which contradicts the price-taking behavior assumption. To model
perfectly competitive markets, we follow Aumann [6, 7] and Hildenbrand [14], who suggested to
model the set of agents by a ﬁnite complete measure space. The insigniﬁcance of individual agents
is thus captured by the idea of a set of zero measure.
In the literature dealing with large economies (inﬁnitely many agents), two solution concepts
are used: the competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium and the core. For the ﬁrst concept, agents are
assumed to take prices as given and they engage in the sale and purchase of commodities in order to
maximize their utilities subject to their budgets. Agents trade freely in a decentralized market and
this process results in allocations which equate supply with demand. The second concept allows
for the possibility of cooperation among agents. They are allowed to bargain multilaterally which
leads to an allocation of resources where it is not possible for any coalition of agents to redistribute
their initial endowments among themselves in any way that makes each member of the coalition
better oﬀ. Aumann [6] proved that in perfectly competitive economies (i.e. economies with an
atomless ﬁnite measure space of agents) with ﬁnitely many commodities, the core coincides with
the set of competitive equilibria. He also proved in [7], that the set of competitive equilibria (and
thus the core) is non-empty. The core-Walras equivalence theorem was extended by Rustichini–
Yannelis [27], to commodity spaces being separable Banach spaces.
Date: January 22, 2004.
12 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
In the framework of large square economies (i.e. with inﬁnitely many agents and inﬁnitely many
commodities), there are several equilibrium existence results: Bewley [9], Khan–Yannelis [16],
Podczeck [24] and Martins-da-Rocha [19] for separable Banach commodity spaces with an interior
point in the positive cone; and Mas-Colell [21], Jones [15], Ostroy–Zame [23], Podczeck [24, 26]
and Martins-da-Rocha [20] for economies with diﬀerentiated commodities.1 To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide an equilibrium existence result for economies with a
separable and reﬂexive Banach lattice (i.e. `p or Lp([0,1]) for 1 < p < +∞). Under assumptions
imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equiv-
alence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [27] and Podczeck [25]. In this paper we prove that
under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of competitive equilibria (and
thus the core) is non-empty. More precisely, we provide two frameworks to prove the existence of
competitive equilibria. In the ﬁrst one, existence is proved under an assumption (borrowed from
Zame [30] and Podczeck [25]) imposing the existence, at each state of nature, of uniform (over
consumption) upper and lower bounds on marginal rates of substitution. In the second one, the
commodity space is `p and existence is proved for preference relations represented by separable
utility functions. But for this framework, we only require the existence of an upper bound on the
marginal rates of substitution at the initial endowment (and not uniformly over consumption) and
we require the existence of a uniform (over consumption) lower bound on the marginal rates of
substitution at only one state of nature.
Recently, Tourky–Yannelis [28] showed that, when aggregation of individual commodity bundles
is formalized in terms of the Bochner integral, given a non-separable Hilbert space E, and given
any atomless measure space (Ω,A,µ), there is an economy with (Ω,A,µ) as space of agents and
E as commodity space that has a non-empty core but does not have a competitive equilibrium.
Contrasting with the positive results of Aumann [6, 7] and their extensions to separable Banach
commodity spaces by Rustichini–Yannelis [27], the crucial condition to get these results is that there
are ”many more agents than commodities”. More precisely, Podczeck [25] proved that the class {E}
of Banach spaces such that, under a list of ”desirable assumptions”, any atomless economy with
commodity space E exhibits core-Walras equivalence2 is exactly the class of Banach spaces that are
separable. However, there is no characterization in the literature of a class of Banach spaces as those
spaces in which the existence of competitive equilibria holds. In our framework, the commodity
space is a separable Banach space, thus under ”desirable assumptions” the core-Walras equivalence
theorem is valid. But, the separability assumption of the commodity space is no more suﬃcient to
get the existence of competitive equilibria. We introduce an additional assumption which requires
a compatibility (Deﬁnition 2.2 and Assumption 3.4) between the geometry of the lattice ordering
of the commodity space and initial endowments. When L2([0,1]) is endowed with the natural
pointwise lattice ordering, we construct an economy satisfying a list of ”desirable assumptions”,
but not satisfying the compatibility assumption and for which there are no competitive equilibria
at all. It appears that for the issue of the existence of competitive equilibria, the topological way
of measuring the cardinality of the number of markets introduced by Tourky–Yannelis [28] is not
appropriate. It is the geometric structure of the lattice ordering that matters. In this paper,
several examples of lattice ordering which satisfy the compatibility condition are given. For these
examples, the positive cone has countably many extreme rays. However the number of extreme
1The commodity space is M([0,1]) the space of Radon measures on [0,1] and the price space is C([0,1]) the
space of continuous functions on [0,1].
2When feasibility of allocation is deﬁned in terms of the Bochner integral.EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 3
directions of the positive cone is not the appropriate way of measuring the cardinality of the number
of markets since positive results for smooth positive cones3 are given in Martins-da-Rocha [20].
Following the approach used in Martins-da-Rocha [19, 20], our proof of the existence of an
equilibrium is based on the discretization of the set of agents. We approximate the initial economy
E by a sequence of economies (En) with ﬁnitely many agents. To each ﬁnite economy En, we use
the lattice structure of the commodity space and the properness assumptions on preferences to get
the existence of a quasi-equilibrium (xn,pn). The last step consists on proving that the sequence
(xn,pn) converges to an equilibrium (x,p). In order to apply a Fatou type lemma to the sequence
of mappings (xn), we need a speciﬁc compatibility (Deﬁnition 2.2 and Assumption 3.4) between
the geometry of the lattice ordering and initial endowments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we deﬁne the model of an economy with inﬁnitely
many agents and commodities and we set out the main deﬁnitions and notations. In Section 3
we give the list of assumptions that economies will be required to satisfy and we present the two
existence results. The diﬀerent assumptions on the marginal rates of substitution are discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the proof of the two theorems.
2. The Model
2.1. Preliminaries. Let E be a separable and reﬂexive Banach lattice.4 We denote by E∗ the
dual space of E, i.e. the space of all continuous linear functions from E into R. If x ∈ E and
p ∈ E∗, the value p(x) of p at x will often be denoted hp,xi. We write k.k for both the norm of E
and the dual norm of E∗. We write w for the weak topology σ(E,E∗) on E, w∗ for the weak-star
topology σ(E∗,E) on E∗, and s for the norm-topology. As usual, the ordering of E is denoted by
>, and E+ denotes the positive cone of E, i.e. E+ = {x ∈ E : x > 0}. The dual space E∗ will
always be regarded as endowed with the dual ordering, i.e. E∗
+ = {p ∈ E∗ : p(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ E+}.
A vector x ∈ E is said positive if x > 0, a linear functional q ∈ E∗ is said strictly positive if
q(x) > 0 whenever x belongs to E+ \ {0}. For x,y ∈ E the expressions x+,x−,|x| have the usual
lattice theoretical meaning. Let τ be a topology on E. If (Cn)n is a sequence of subsets of E, the
τ-sequential upper limit of (Cn)n, is denoted τ-lsnCn and is deﬁned by
τ-lsnCn := {x ∈ E : x = τ-lim
k
xk , xk ∈ Cn(k)}
where (Cn(k))k is a subsequence of (Cn)n.
The Borel σ-algebra of E for the norm-topology or for the weak-topology coincide and is denoted
by B. Let (Ω,A,µ) be a complete ﬁnite positive measure space. A correspondence F from Ω to E
is said to be graph measurable if {(a,x) ∈ Ω×`p : x ∈ F(a)} belongs to A⊗B. A correspondence
P from Ω to E × E is said to be graph measurable if {(a,x,z) ∈ Ω × E × E : (x,z) ∈ P(a)}
belongs to A ⊗ B ⊗ B. A mapping s from Ω to E is simple if there exist x1,x2,... ,xn in E and
A1,A2,... ,An in A such that s =
Pn
i=1 xiχAi where χAi(a) = 1 if a ∈ Ai and χAi(a) = 0 if
a 6∈ Ai. A mapping x : Ω → E is Bochner measurable if there is a sequence of simple mappings
sn : Ω → E such that limn ksn(a) − x(a)k = 0 almost every where. Since E is separable, we know
from Pettis’ measurability theorem (see [12, Theorem II.1.2, p.42]) that a mapping x : Ω → E is
Bochner measurable if and only if for each B ∈ B, x−1(B) := {a ∈ Ω : x(a) ∈ B} belongs to
A. A Bochner measurable mapping x from Ω to E is Bochner integrable if there is a sequence of
simple mappings sn : Ω → E such that limn
R
Ω ksn(a) − x(a)kdµ(a) = 0. For each measurable set
3The commodity space is M([0,1]) ordered by the natural pointwise positive cone.
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A in A, we denote by
R
A xdµ the limit limn
R
A sndµ. It can easily be shown (see [12, p.45]) that













2.2. Fatou’s cone. We deﬁne hereafter a class of lattice orderings which will enable us to apply
a Fatou type lemma.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let E be a Banach lattice, a functional ρ from E into [−∞,+∞] is a positive
extended linear functional if
(i) the space Eρ = {x ∈ E : ρ(x) ∈ R} is a vector subspace of E,
(ii) the restriction of ρ to Eρ is linear and,
(iii) the functional ρ is positive, i.e. for any y > x > 0, we have ρ(y) > ρ(x) > 0.
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let E be a Banach lattice ordered by a positive cone E+ and let e : Ω → E+
be a Bochner integrable mapping. The cone E+ is a Fatou’s cone relatively to e if there exists a
positive extended linear functional ρ such that
(a) for every x in E+, kxk 6 ρ(x),
(b) the function a 7→ ρ[e(a)] from Ω to R+ is integrable.
Example 2.3. Take E = `p for any 1 < p < +∞, and E+ = `
p
+ the natural pointwise positive
cone.5 Then, for any Bochner integrable mapping e : Ω → `
p
+, if the function6 a 7→ ke(a)k1 is
integrable, then E+ is a Fatou’s cone relatively to e.
Example 2.4. Take E = L2([0,1]) and let (bn)n be an Hilbert basis of E. Let
E+ = {x ∈ E : ∀n ∈ N,hx,bni > 0},






is integrable, then E+ is a Fatou’s cone relatively to e.
Remark 2.5. In the above two examples, the positive cone has countably many extreme rays. Let
(T,T ,σ) be an atomless measure space and 1 < p < +∞. We prove in Appendix D that when
E = Lp(T,T ,σ) is ordered by the pointwise ”smooth” positive cone E+ = Lp(T,T ,σ)+, then for
every Bochner integrable mapping e : Ω → E+ with
R
Ω edµ > 0, the cone E+ is not a Fatou’s cone
relatively to e.
2.3. The Model. An economy E is a list
E = ((Ω,A,µ),E,X,,e),
where X is a correspondence from Ω to E,  is a correspondence from Ω to E × E and e is
a mapping from Ω to E. The space of agents is (Ω,A,µ), a complete ﬁnite positive measure
space. The commodity space is E. For each agent a ∈ Ω, the consumption set is X(a), the initial
endowment is e(a) ∈ E and the preference/indiﬀerence relation is a⊂ X(a) × X(a), a reﬂexive
binary relation on X(a).
5The natural pointwise positive cone of `p is `
p
+ = {x = (xn) ∈ `p : ∀n ∈ N, xn > 0}.
6If x = (xn) belongs to `p, we let kxk1 =
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We deﬁne the correspondence7 Pa : X(a)  X(a) by Pa(x) = {x0 ∈ X(a) : x0 a x}. In
particular, if x ∈ X(a) is a consumption bundle, the set Pa(x) is the set of consumption bundles
strictly preferred to x by agent a. We let P be the correspondence from Ω to E × E deﬁned for
each a ∈ Ω by P(a) = {(x,x0) ∈ X(a) × X(a) : x0 a x}.
The set of allocations (or plans) of the economy is the set S1(X) of Bochner integrable selections
of X, i.e. S1(X) is the set of mappings x from Ω to E which are Bochner integrable and which







We assume that the mapping e : Ω → E is a Bochner integrable mapping and we denote by
ω :=
R
Ω edµ the aggregate initial endowment.
Deﬁnition 2.6. A pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p is said to
be a competitive equilibrium if for almost every a ∈ Ω, hp,x(a)i = hp,e(a)i, and z ∈ Pa(x(a))
implies hp,zi > hp,x(a)i.
3. Existence of a competitive Equilibrium
We will maintain in this paper the following assumptions on the economy E.
Assumption 3.1. For each a ∈ Ω,
(i) the consumption set is X(a) = E+;
(ii) the initial endowment is not zero, i.e. e(a) > 0;
(iii) a is reﬂexive, transitive and complete;
(iv) a is strictly monotone, i.e. for each x ∈ X(a), if z > x then z a x.
Assumption 3.2. For each a ∈ Ω, for every x ∈ X(a),
(i) the sets Pa(x) and P−1
a (x) = {z ∈ X(a): x a z} are norm-open in X(a);
(ii) the set {z ∈ X(a): z a x} is convex.
Assumption 3.3. The correspondence P is graph measurable.
Assumption 3.4. The positive cone E+ is a Fatou’s cone relatively to e.
Remark 3.1. Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are standard in the literature dealing with exchange economies
with ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely many agents. We will see that in our framework, we can not dispense
with Assumption 3.4.
We provide hereafter two frameworks to prove the existence of competitive equilibria. In the ﬁrst
one, existence is proved under an assumption imposing upper and lower uniform (over agents and
consumption) bounds on marginal rates of substitution. In the second one, existence is proved for
preference relations represented by separable utility functions deﬁned on `p, but the assumption on
the marginal rates of substitution required for the existence is weaker. We only require a uniform
(over agents only) upper bound on the marginal rates of substitution at the initial endowment and
a uniform (over agents and consumption) lower bound on the marginal rates of substitution at
only one state of nature.
7As usual, y a x means [y a x and x 6a y]. Note that the binary relation a coincide with the graph of the
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3.1. The general case. In this section, we consider economies with general preference relations.
The following requirement is borrowed from Zame [30]. It is discussed in Section 4.
Deﬁnition 3.2. The preference relations (a) are said to be strong-uniformly proper, if there
exist strictly positive prices α and β in E∗ with α 6 β and such that for every a ∈ Ω, whenever
x,u,v ∈ E+ satisfy v 6 x and hα,ui > hβ,vi then x − v + u a x.
An economy E is said strong-uniformly proper if it has strong-uniformly proper preference
relations.
We can now state our ﬁrst result for economies with general preference relations.
Theorem 3.3. If the economy E is strong-uniformly proper then there exists a competitive equi-
librium.
Remark 3.4. The strong-uniform properness assumption was already used in Zame [30]. Podczeck
in [26] proved the equivalence between the core and the set of competitive equilibria under this
assumption. Note that Rustichini–Yannelis [27] also proved the equivalence between the core and
the set of competitive equilibria under another properness assumption.
Assumption 3.4 is unusual. Following Zame [30] we provide hereafter two examples of a strong-
uniformly proper economies satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.3 and not satisfying Assumption 3.4. For
these economies the set of competitive equilibria is empty.
Counterexample 3.5. Consider the economy E where Ω = [0,1], A is the Lebesgue σ-algebra and µ
is the Lebesgue measure. The commodity space E is `p for 1 < p < +∞, ordered by the pointwise
positive cone `
p





and the initial endowment is deﬁned by e(a) = (1,1/2,1/3,... ,1/n,...). The economy E is
strong-uniformly proper, it satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.3 but not Assumption 3.4. It is proved in
Zame [30] that E has no competitive equilibrium.
Counterexample 3.6. Consider the economy E where Ω = [0,1], A is the Lebesgue σ-algebra and
µ is the Lebesgue measure. The commodity space E is Lp([0,1],µ) where 1 < p < +∞ ordered by
the ”smooth” pointwise positive cone Lp([0,1],µ)+ For each trader a ∈ [0,1], the utility function












2a if 0 6 t 6 a
a−2
2(a−1) + t
2(a−1) if a 6 t 6 1.
The economy E is strong-uniformly proper, it satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.3 but not Assumption 3.4.
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3.2. The separable case. In this section, we consider economies with the space `p as the com-
modity space and for which preference relations are represented by separable utility functions. For
each 1 < p < +∞, we denote by `p the real vector space of sequences x = (xk)k in RN such that
limn
Pn
k=0 |xk|p < ∞ and we denote by kxkp = (
P
k∈N |xk|p)1/p. We denote by `
p
+ the natural
positive cone deﬁned by x ∈ `
p
+ if and only if xk > 0 for each k ∈ N. The space `p endowed with
the norm k.kp and the positive cone `
p
+ is a reﬂexive and separable Banach lattice whose dual is
`q where 1 < q < +∞ is deﬁned by 1/p + 1/q = 1.
Deﬁnition 3.7. A utility function u : `
p
+ → R is called separable if there exists for each n, a







The function v = (vn) is called the kernel of u. The left derivative of vn in t > 0 is noted v−
n (t)
and the right derivative is denoted v+
n (t). If x ∈ `
p




+ we deﬁne S(x) = {h ∈ `p: ∃t > 0, x + th > 0} and I(x) = S(x) ∩ −S(x). We deﬁne
u0(x) · h = limr→0(1/r)[u(x + rh) − u(x)] for each x ∈ `
p
+ and each h ∈ S(x). Note that if h > 0




For economies with separable utility functions, a weaker condition than the uniform properness
will be suﬃcient to prove the existence of competitive equilibria.
Deﬁnition 3.8. An economy E is said separably proper if for each agent a ∈ Ω, the preference
relation a is represented8 by a separable utility function ua which kernel is denoted va and if
there exists a measurable set Ω0 ∈ A of full measure,9 satisfying the following conditions.
(a) There exists β ∈ `q such that for each a ∈ Ω0,
v−
a (e(a)) 6 β.
(b) There exists k ∈ N and αk > 0 such that ωkαk > 0 and for each a ∈ Ω0,
0 < αk 6 inf{v
+





We can now state our second existence result for economies with preference relations represented
by utility functions.
Theorem 3.9. If the economy E is separably proper then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
The two properness conditions are not comparable. Obviously, not all strong-uniformly proper
economies are separably proper. Moreover, we provide hereafter an example of an economy which
is separably proper but not strong-uniformly proper.
Example 3.10. Consider the economy E where Ω = [0,1], A is the Lebesgue σ-algebra and µ is the
Lebesgue measure. For each trader a ∈ [0,1], the consumption set coincide with `
p
+, the utility
function ua is deﬁned by





8That is x0 a x if and only if ua(x0) > ua(x).
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and the initial endowment is deﬁned by e(a) = (1,1/2,1/3,... ,1/n,...). Following Example 4.5
the economy E satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Moreover this economy is separably proper but not
strong-uniformly proper.
4. Proper economies
We discuss in this section the notions of properness used in Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.9.
4.1. Strong-uniformly proper economies. We recall that the preference relations (a) are
said to be strong-uniformly proper, if there exist strictly positive prices α and β in E+ with α 6 β
and such that for every a ∈ Ω, whenever x,u,v ∈ E+ satisfy v 6 x and hα,ui > hβ,vi then
x − v + u a x. This properness condition is borrowed from Zame [30]. Note that this is a
requirement on preferences that is uniform over agents as well as over consumption. We refer
to Zame [30] for a discussion of this condition as well as for corresponding examples. Following
Podczeck [25], it may be seen that if for each a ∈ Ω, {y ∈ X(a): y a x} is convex then uniform
properness is equivalent to the following statement: There are strictly positive prices α,β ∈ E∗,
such that given any a ∈ Ω and x ∈ X(a) there is a price p in the order interval [α,β] such that
hp,xi 6 hp,yi for all y ∈ X(a) with y a x. Since supporting prices are measures of marginal rates
of substitution, the strong-uniform properness assumption is a condition that puts strong bounds
on these rates.
We recall the notion of uniform properness introduced by Yannelis–Zame [29] for economies
with ﬁnitely many agents.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The preference relations (a) are said to be v-uniformly proper with v ∈ E,
if there exists a norm-open 0-neighborhood V ⊂ E such that for each a ∈ Ω, for each x ∈ E+,
(x + Γ) ∩ E+ ⊂ Pa(x) where Γ = ∪t>0t(v + V ).
Remark 4.2. The strong-uniform properness assumption on the preference relations implies that
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀x ∈ E+, (x + Γ) ∩ E+ ⊂ Pa(x),
where Γ is the convex and norm-open cone deﬁned by Γ = {x ∈ E: α(x+) > β(x−)}.
Example 4.3. Consider the case of positive separable utility functions ua : `
p
+ → R, deﬁned by the
formula ua(x) =
P
n va,n(xn) where for each n, the function va,n : [0,+∞) → R is continuous,
the derivative v0
a,n(t) exists for each t > 0. Suppose that there exist α and β two strictly positive
functionals in `q such that
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀t > 0, αn 6 v0
a,n(t) 6 βn.
Then the preference relations deﬁned by the utility functions (ua)a∈Ω are strong-uniformly proper.
Indeed, let x,y,z ∈ `
p
+ satisfying y 6 x and α(z) > β(y). Using the mean value theorem, we see
that for each n there exists tn > 0 such that
va,n(xn − yn + zn) − vn(x) = v0
a,n(tn)[zn − yn].
But v0
a,n(tn)[zn − yn] > αnzn − βnyn, in particular
u(x − y + z) − v(x) > α(z) − β(y) > 0.
We refer to Araujo–Monteiro [3], Le Van [17] and Aliprantis [1] for precisions about proper
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4.2. Separably proper economies. Following Aliprantis [1], we introduce the following notion
of separable utility function.
Deﬁnition 4.4. A separable utility function u : `
p
+ → R, where u(x) =
P
n vn(xn), is said to be
rational if for each n ∈ N,
(a) vn(0) = 0;
(b) vn is positive, continuous and concave on [0,+∞); and
(c) vn is diﬀerentiable on (0,+∞) with v0
n(t) > 0 for each t > 0.
Now let u be a rational separable utility function. The components of the lower and upper
gradient sequences v0 = (v0
1,v0
2,...) and v0 = (v0
1,v0









Following Aliprantis [1, Theorem 6.7], we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Let u : `
p
+ → R be rational utility function given by u(x) =
P
n vn(xn). If the
preference relations represented by u are ω-uniformly proper for some ω ∈ `p strictly positive, then
(a) the lower gradient v0 is non-zero and belongs to `
q
+; and






It follows that if E is an economy with rational separable utility function such that E is ω-
uniformly proper and ω is strictly positive, then E is separably proper. We provide hereafter
an example of a rational separable utility function which is separably proper but which is not
uniformly proper.
Example 4.5. Consider the rational separable utility function u : `
p
+ → R deﬁned by
v0(t) = t and ∀n > 1, vn(t) =
1 − exp(−tn2)
n2 .
For each n > 1, v0
n(t) = exp(−n2t). It follows that
v0 = (1,0,0,...) and v0 = (1,1,1,...).
It follows that u is not uniformly proper. However if e = (en)n is deﬁned by e0 = 1 and for each
n > 1 by en = 1/n then
v0(e) = (e−n)n ∈ `
p
+.
Hence u is separably proper.
5. Proof of Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.9
Since E is a separable and reﬂexive Banach space, it follows that E∗ is norm-separable. Let






The topology deﬁned by this distance coincide with the w-topology on norm-bounded subsets of
E. Moreover, the d-topology is separable and the Borel σ-algebra generated by d coincide with
the Borel σ-algebra B generated by the norm-topology and the w-topology.10 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Let E be an economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Suppose that E is either strong-uniformly
proper or separably proper. The correspondence X is graph measurable. Applying Theorem B.1,
there exists a sequence (fk)k of measurable selections of X such that for each a ∈ Ω, X(a) =
s-cl{fk(a): k ∈ N}. For every k ∈ N, we let Rk be the correspondence from Ω into E, deﬁned by
Rk(a) = {x ∈ E+ : x a fk(a)}. For each ν ∈ N, we let Xν : a 7→ Xν(a) := X(a) ∩ νB and
Rk,ν : a  Rk,ν(a) := Rk(a) ∩ νB, where B is the closed unit ball in E.
Claim 5.1. There exists10 a sequence (σn)n of measurable partitions σn = (An
i )i∈Sn of (Ω,A),
and a sequence (An)n of ﬁnite sets An = {an
i : i ∈ Sn} subordinated to the measurable partition




ken(a) − e(a)k = 0 and ∀k ∈ N, lim
n
kfn
k (a) − fk(a)k = 0;





(iii) if we pose12 g(a) := ρ[e(a)] then g is an integrable function satisfying
∀n ∈ N, ρ[en(a)] 6 1 + g(a).
Proof. If f is a function from Ω to E, then we let {f(.)} be the correspondence from Ω into E
deﬁned for each a ∈ Ω, by {f(.)}(a) := {f(a)}. Note that if f is measurable then f is Bochner
integrable if and only if kf(.)k : a 7→ kf(a)k from Ω to R+ is integrable.
Let Z := E × E and consider the following distance δ on Z deﬁned for each x = (x1,x2) and
y = (y1,y2) in Z by
δ(x,y) := kx1 − y1k + d(x2,y2).
The metric space (Z,δ) is complete and separable. Let G := {ρ[e(.)]} and13
F := {{e(.)} × {0},{fk(.)} × {0},{0} × Rk : k ∈ N}.
Now apply Theorem B.6. 









where In = {i ∈ Sn: µ(An
i ) 6= 0} is the ﬁnite set of consumers; σ is the counting measure on In;
for each agent i ∈ In, the consumption set is deﬁned by Xn
i := µ(An
i )X(an
i ) = E+, the initial
endowment is deﬁned by en
i := µ(An
i )e(an
i ) and the preference relation is deﬁned by x0 n








i is deﬁned by Pn
i (x) = µ(An
i )Pan
i (x/µ(An
i )), for each x ∈ Xn
i .
Claim 5.2. There exists a feasible allocation (xn
i )i∈In for the ﬁnite economy En, a non-zero price
pn and a w∗-compact set K ⊂ E∗ such that
10We refer to Appendix B for deﬁnitions and notations.
11Following notations of Section B.2, if f is function from Ω to E, then for each n, {f(.)}n = {fn(.)}.
12The functional ρ is given by Assumption 3.4.
13If F and G are two correspondences from Ω to E, then we let F × G be the correspondence from Ω to E × E,
deﬁned for each a ∈ Ω by (F × G)(a) = F(a) × G(a).EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 11
(1) for each i ∈ In, hpn,xn
i i = hpn,en
i i, and z ∈ Pn
i (xn
i ) implies hpn,zi > hpn,xn
i i; and
(2) pn ∈ K with hpn,ωi = 1.
Proof. If the economy E is strong-uniformly proper then each economy En satisﬁes the assumptions
of Theorem A.1. In particular if we let K := {q ∈ E∗: hq,ωi = 1 and hq,Γi > 0}, where
Γ = {x ∈ E : hα,x+i > hβ,x−i}, then Claim 5.2 is proved.
If the economy E is separably proper then for each n large enough, αkωn
k > 0. Hence the economy
En satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem A.3. In particular for each n, kpnkq 6 (1/αkωn
k)kβkq.
Since (ωn
k)n is norm-convergent to ωk, it follows that the sequence (pn)n lies in a norm-bounded
set K ⊂ `q. In particular, Claim 5.2 is proved. 


















for a.e. a ∈ Ω, hpn,xn(a)i = hpn,en(a)i and z ∈ Pn
a (xn(a)) ⇒ hpn,zi > hpn,en(a)i (5.2)
pn ∈ K and hpn,ωi = 1. (5.3)
The set K is w∗-compact. Since E is norm-separable, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we
can suppose that (pn)n w∗-converge to a non-zero price p ∈ E∗ which satisﬁes hp,ωi = 1.
Now we want to apply a Fatou’s Lemma to the sequence (xn). It is only at this step that we
need Assumption 3.4. For each z ∈ E+, kzk 6 ρ(z); and for each y ∈ E+, ρ(z + y) = ρ(z) + ρ(y).

















Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that w-limn
R
Ω xndµ exists in E. Applying
Fatou’s Lemma (Theorem C.1) of Cornet–Martins-da-Rocha [10], there exists a Bochner integrable








x(a) ∈ co w-lsn{xn(a)} a.e. (5.5)







Proof. This is a direct consequence of Claim 5.1, (5.1) and (5.4). 
Claim 5.4. For almost every a ∈ Ω, x(a) ∈ E+ and z ∈ Pa(x(a)) implies hp,zi > hp,e(a)i.12 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Proof. Consider Ω0 =
S
n∈N Ω \ (∪i∈InAn
i ), then µ(Ω0) = 0. Let Ω0 be a measurable subset of
Ω \ Ω0 with µ(Ω \ Ω0) = 0 and such that all almost everywhere assumptions and properties are
satisﬁed for each a ∈ Ω0.
Since X(a) = E+ is closed convex, we have that for each a ∈ Ω0, x(a) ∈ X(a). We will now
prove that for each a ∈ Ω0, if z ∈ Pa(x(a)) then hp,zi > hp,e(a)i. Let a ∈ Ω0 and let z ∈ Pa(x(a)).
Since E+ = s-cl{fk(a) : k ∈ N}, we can suppose (extracting a subsequence if necessary) that
(fk(a))k is norm-convergent to z. But Pa(x(a)) is norm-open in E+, thus there exists k0 ∈ N, such
that for each k > k0, fk(a) ∈ Pa(x(a)). To prove that hp,zi > hp,e(a)i, it is suﬃcient to prove
that for each k large enough, hp,fk(a)i > hp,e(a)i. Now, let k > k0.
Claim 5.5. There exists an increasing function ϕ : N → N such that
∀n ∈ N, f
ϕ(n)






Proof. Suppose that for each increasing function ϕ : N → N, there exists an increasing function
φ : N → N, such that:
∀n ∈ N, xϕ◦φ(n)(a) ∈ R
ϕ◦φ(n)
k (a).
Let ` ∈ w-ls{xn(a) : n ∈ N}, then there exists a subsequence (xϕ(n)(a))n w-converging to `. In
particular (xϕ◦φ(n)(a))n is w-convergent to `. It follows that there exists ν > 0 such that for each
n, xϕ◦φ(n)(a) belongs to νB. In particular, d(xϕ◦φ(n)(a),R
ϕ◦φ(n)
k,ν (a)) = 0. Applying Claim 5.1,
it follows that d(`,Rk,ν(a)) = 0. Since Rk,ν(a) is w-closed and d coincide with w on νB, we
have that ` ∈ Rk(a). Thus w-ls{xn(a)} ⊂ Rk(a), and under Assumption 3.2, this implies that
co w-lsn{xn(a)} ⊂ Rk(a). It follows that x(a) ∈ Rk(a), i.e. fk(a) 6∈ Pa(x(a)): contradiction. 











. Passing to the limit,
we get that hp,fk(a)i > hp,e(a)i. 
Now let ¯ x be the Bochner integrable mapping from Ω to `p deﬁned by




Claim 5.6. The pair (¯ x,p) is an equilibrium of E.
Proof. Since
R
Ω(e − x)dµ > 0, Assumption 3.1 implies that ¯ x(a) ∈ E+ and Pa(¯ x(a)) ⊂ Pa(x(a)).
In particular the allocation ¯ x is feasible and for each a ∈ Ω0, if z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) then hp,zi > hp,e(a)i.
Since a is monotone, it follows that ¯ x(a) belongs to the norm-closure of Pa(¯ x(a)), in particular
hp, ¯ x(a)i > hp,e(a)i. But
R
Ω ¯ xdµ =
R
Ω edµ, it follows that for almost every a ∈ Ω, hp, ¯ x(a)i =
hp,e(a)i. To prove that (¯ x,p) is an equilibrium, it is now suﬃcient to prove that for almost every
a ∈ Ω,
inf{hp,zi : z ∈ E+} < hp,e(a)i.
Let B := {a ∈ Ω0: hp,e(a)i > 0}. The set B is measurable and since hp,ωi = 1, µ(B) 6= 0. Now
for each a ∈ B, inf{hp,zi : z ∈ E+} < hp,e(a)i and z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) ⇒ hp,zi > hp, ¯ x(a)i. It follows
that
∀a ∈ B, z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)) ⇒ hp,zi > hp, ¯ x(a)i.EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 13
The preference relation a is monotone, i.e. for each z > 0, ¯ x(a) + z ∈ Pa(¯ x(a)). It follows that
for each z > 0, hp,zi > 0. Now from Assumption 3.1, for each a ∈ Ω, e(a) > 0, hence
inf{hp,zi : z ∈ E+} = 0 < hp,e(a)i.

Appendix A. Finitely many consumers
We suppose in this section that the economy is ﬁnite in the sense that the set of consumers
(Ω,A,µ) is (I,2I,σ) where I is a ﬁnite set, 2I is the σ-algebra of all subsets of I and σ is the
counting measure.
A.1. The general case. If E is strong-uniformly proper then we denote by Γ the norm-open
convex cone deﬁned by Γ = {x ∈ E : hα,x+i > hβ,x−i}.
Theorem A.1. Let E be a ﬁnite economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. If E is strong-uniformly
proper then there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p
such that
(1) for each i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii;
(2) hp,ωi = 1 and hp,Γi > 0.
Proof. Since order intervals [0,x] = {y ∈ E: 0 6 y 6 x} are w-compact,14 following Floren-
zano [13], there exists a feasible allocation x = (xi)i such that15




Lemma A.2. G(x) ∩ −Γ = ∅.
Proof. To see this,16 assume by way of contradiction that G(x)∩−Γ 6= ∅. Then there exist γ ∈ Γ,
(λi)i with λi > 0,
P
i λi = 1 and (zi)i with zi ∈ Pi(xi) such that
X
i




Suppose ﬁrst that γ > 0. For each i ∈ I, we set yi := zi + γ. Then yi i zi for each i since







and we have thus got a contradiction.
Thus suppose that γ− 6= 0. We must have γ− 6
P
i λizi, so by the Riesz decomposition theorem
there exist elements ui > 0 such that ui 6 zi and
P





14Since E is a Banach lattice, the order interval [0,x] is a subset of kxkB. Since E is separable and reﬂexive
then B is w-compact.
15In fact x is an Edgeworth equilibrium of E.
16The argument given in the sequel to establish this lemma is taken from Zame [30] and Podczeck [25].14 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO








with strict inequality if ui 6= 0. Hence because ui 6 zi and vi > 0, we have zi − ui + vi i zi
for each i (in fact, zi − ui + vi i zi in case ui 6= 0), and therefore by transitivity of preference
relations, zi − ui + vi i xi. Also
X
i
λi(zi − ui + vi) =
X
i









again we get a contradiction. 
Following Lemma A.2, since Γ is norm-open, it follows from the separation theorem that there
exists some non-zero linear functional p ∈ E∗ with hp,gi > −hp,γi for each g ∈ G(x) and γ ∈ Γ.
It is now routine to prove that (x,p) satisﬁes properties (1) and (2) of Theorem A.1. 
A.2. The separable case. We recall that a utility function u : `
p
+ → R is called separable if there







Theorem A.3. Let E be a ﬁnite economy satisfying Assumptions 3.1–3.4. If E is separably proper
then there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation x and a non-zero price p such that
(1) for each i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii;
(2) hp,ωi = 1 and kpkq 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq.
The proof of Theorem A.3 is mostly inspired by the proof of Theorem 3 in Araujo–Monteiro [4].
Proof. We prove Theorem A.3 in two steps. For the ﬁrst step, we suppose that the economy
satisﬁes an additional assumption on the initial endowments.
Step 1: Strictly positive initial endowments. Suppose that for each i, ei is strictly positive.
Let Eω be the vector space of all z ∈ `p such that there exists r > 0 satisfying −rω 6 z 6 rω. From
Lemma 1 in Araujo–Monteiro [4], there exists a pair (x,p) consisting of a feasible allocation17 x
and a non-zero linear functional p : Eω → R such that p is positive, i.e. hp,zi > 0 for each z ∈ Eω
+;
hp,ωi = 1 and such that
∀i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii and z ∈ Pi(xi) ∩ Eω ⇒ hp,zi > hp,eii.
Now there exists i with hp,eii > 0, and since ui is strictly monotone, p is strictly positive, i.e.
hp,zi > 0 for each 0 6= z ∈ Eω
+. In particular hp,eii > 0 for each i ∈ I. By the concave alternative
(see Lemma 5 in [4]), for each i there exists λi > 0 such that
∀z ∈ Eω
+, ui(z) − ui(xi) 6 λi hp,z − xii. (A.1)
For z ∈ `
p
+ we deﬁne S(z) = {h ∈ `p: ∃t > 0, z + th > 0} and I(z) = S(z) ∩ −S(z). Using (A.1)
like in [4], we have
∀h ∈ I(xi) ∩ Eω






17Note that if x is a feasible allocation then xi ∈ Eω.EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 15
Since ei is strictly positive for each i, we have that b := inf{ei: i ∈ I} is strictly positive. Hence
Eb is norm-dense in `p. From this we conclude that if p is norm-continuous on Eb then we can
extend it to a linear functional still noted p in `q, such that (x,p) satisﬁes
∀i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii and z ∈ Pi(xi) ⇒ hp,zi > hp,eii.
So let us prove that p is norm-continuous on Eb.
We deﬁne for each n, In := {i ∈ I : xi,n > ei,n} and for each i we deﬁne Ni = {n ∈ N : i =
minIn}. Since x is a feasible allocation, we have In 6= ∅ for every n and (Ni)i is a partition of N.






|hn| if n ∈ Ni
0 if n 6∈ Ni.

































i(z)·h = limr→0(1/r)(ui(z +rh)−ui(z)) for each z ∈ `
p
+ and each h ∈ S(z). It follows
from (A.1) and separable properness that
0 < αkωk < u0












βn|hn| 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq khkp .
From separable properness we have that kβkq < +∞. This proves the norm-continuity of p on Eb.
Step 2: Positive initial endowments. Let E be a separably proper ﬁnite economy satisfying
Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Let v be a strictly positive vector of `p and consider En the economy
deﬁned by E = (I,`p,X,,en) where en
i := ei + (1/n)v. Since v
−
i (en
i ) 6 v
−
i (ei), the economy
En is separably proper and satisﬁes Assumptions 3.1–3.4. Applying Step 1, there exists a pair
(xn,pn) consisting of a feasible allocation xn and a non-zero price pn such that for each i ∈ I,
hp,xn
i i = hp,en
i i, z ∈ Pi(xn
i ) implies hpn,zi > hpn,xn
i i, hpn,ωni = 1 and kpnkq 6 (1/αkωn
k)kβkq.
Since the sequence (ωn
k)n is norm-convergent to ωk, it follows that the sequence (pn)n is norm-
bounded, and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that the sequence (pn)n is
w∗-convergent to a price p ∈ `q with kpkq 6 (1/αkωk)kβkq. Moreover, since hpn,ωni = 1 it follows
that hp,ωi = 1.
For each i, xn
i belongs to the interval [0,ω + v], in particular, passing to a subsequence if
necessary, we can suppose that (xn






we have that x is a feasible allocation for the economy E. It is now routine to prove that for each
i ∈ I, hp,xii = hp,eii, and z ∈ Pi(xi) implies hp,zi > hp,xii. 
18Note that v−
i,n is a decreasing function.16 A. ARAUJO, V. F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND P. K. MONTEIRO
Appendix B. Measurable correspondences
We consider (Ω,A,µ) a ﬁnite complete measure space and (D,d) a separable metric space.
We recall that a function f : Ω → D is measurable if for each open set G ⊂ D, f−1(G) ∈ A
where f−1(G) := {a ∈ Ω : f(a) ∈ G}. A correspondence F : Ω  D is graph measurable if
GF := {(a,x) ∈ Ω × D : x ∈ F(a)} ∈ A ⊗ B(D), where B(D) is the σ-algebra of Borelian subsets
of D.
B.1. Measurable selections. Following Aumann [8], graph measurable correspondences have
measurable selections.
Theorem B.1. Consider F a graph measurable correspondence from Ω into D with non-empty
values. If (D,d) is complete then there exists a sequence (zn)n of measurable selections of F, such
that for each a ∈ Ω, (zn(a))n is d-dense in F(a).
B.2. Discretization of measurable correspondences.
Deﬁnition B.2. A partition σ = (Ai)i∈I of Ω is a measurable partition if for each i ∈ I, the set
Ai is non-empty and belongs to A. A ﬁnite subset Aσ of Ω is subordinated to the partition σ if
there exists a family (ai)i∈I ∈
Q
i∈I Ai such that Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}.
Given a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ = (Ai)i∈I is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, we consider φ(σ,Aσ) the application which maps each measurable





where χAi is the characteristic19 function associated to Ai.
Deﬁnition B.3. A function s : Ω → D is called a simple function subordinated to f if there exists
a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ,
such that s = φ(σ,Aσ)(f).
Given a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ = (Ai)i∈I is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ = {ai : i ∈ I}
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, we consider ψ(σ,Aσ), the application which maps each measurable





Deﬁnition B.4. A correspondence S : Ω → D is called a simple correspondence subordinated to a
correspondence F if there exists a couple (σ,Aσ) where σ is a measurable partition of Ω, and Aσ
is a ﬁnite set subordinated to σ, such that S = ψ(σ,Aσ)(F).
Remark B.5. If f is a function from Ω to D, let {f} be the correspondence from Ω into D, deﬁned
for each a ∈ Ω by {f}(a) := {f(a)}. We check that
ψ(σ,Aσ)(F) = {φ(σ,Aσ)(f)}.
19That is, for each a ∈ Ω, χAi(a) = 1 if a ∈ Ai and χAi(a) = 0 elsewhere.EQUILIBRIA IN REFLEXIVE BANACH LATTICES WITH A CONTINUUM OF AGENTS 17
The space of all non-empty subsets of D is noted P∗(D). We let τWd be the Wijsman topology
on P∗(D), that is the weak topology on P∗(D) generated by the family of distance functions
(d(x,.))x∈D.
Hereafter we assert that for a countable set of graph measurable correspondences, there exists a
sequence of measurable partitions approximating each correspondence. The proof of the following
theorem is given in Martins-da-Rocha [18].
Theorem B.6. Let F be a countable set of graph measurable correspondences with non-empty
values from Ω into D and let G be a ﬁnite set of integrable functions from Ω into R. There exists a
sequence (σn)n of ﬁner and ﬁner measurable partitions σn = (An
i )i∈In of Ω, satisfying the following
properties.
(a) Let (An)n be a sequence of ﬁnite sets An subordinated to the measurable partition σn and
let F ∈ F. For each n ∈ N, we deﬁne the simple correspondence Fn := ψ(σn,An)(F)
subordinated to F. Then for each a ∈ Ω, F(a) is the Wijsman limit of the sequence
(Fn(a))n, i.e.,
∀a ∈ Ω, ∀x ∈ D, lim
n
d(x,Fn(a)) = d(x,F(a)).
(b) There exists a sequence (An)n of ﬁnite sets An subordinated to the measurable partition
σn, such that for each n, if we let fn := φ(σn,An)(f) be the simple function subordinated
to each f ∈ G, then









|fn(a) − f(a)|dµ(a) = 0.
Remark B.7. The property (a) implies in particular that, if (xn)n is a sequence of D, d-converging
to x ∈ D, then
∀a ∈ Ω, lim
n
d(xn,Fn(a)) = d(x,F(a)).
It follows that if F is non-empty closed valued, then property (a) implies that
∀a ∈ Ω, lsnFn(a) ⊂ F(a).
Appendix C. Fatou’s Lemma
The proof of the following theorem is given in Cornet–Martins-da-Rocha [10].
Theorem C.1. Let (Ω,A,µ) be a ﬁnite positive complete measure space. Let (fn)n be a sequence
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and









Appendix D. Fatou’s cone
Proposition D.1. Let (T,T ,σ) be an atomless measure space. For 1 < p < +∞ we consider the
space E = Lp(T,T ,σ) ordered by the cone E+ deﬁned by
E+ = {f ∈ Lp(T,T ,σ) : ∀t ∈ T,f(t) > 0}.
The space E ordered by the cone E+ is a Banach lattice. But for every Bochner integrable mapping
e : Ω → E+ with
R
Ω edµ > 0, the cone E+ is not a Fatou’s cone relatively to e.
Proof. Consider a Bochner integrable mapping e : Ω → E+ with
R
Ω edµ > 0. Suppose that E+ is
a Fatou’s cone relatively to e, then there exists a positive extended linear functional ρ satisfying
conditions (a) and (b) of Deﬁnition 2.2. Since a 7→ ρ[e(a)] is integrable, there exists Ω0 in A such
that µ(Ω \ Ω0) = 1 and for all a ∈ Ω0, ρ[e(a)] < +∞. Moreover, since
R
Ω edµ > 0, there exists
b ∈ Ω0 such that e(b) > 0. We let ω = e(b), without any loss of generality, we may assume that
kωk = 1. We denote by δ the probability on (T,T ) deﬁned by




Since (T,T ,σ) is atomless, the measure space (T,T ,δ) is also atomless. Applying Lyapunov
Convexity Theorem (see Aliprantis–Border [2, Theorem 12.33]), {δ(B) : B ∈ T } = [0,1]. Fix







Now the restriction of δ to T \ T1 is a ﬁnite positive measure, such that
{δ(B) : B ∈ T and B ∩ T1 = ∅} = [0,1 − 1/n].







By induction, there exists a measurable partition (T1,... ,Tn) of T such that







For each k ∈ {1,... ,n}, let χk be the characteristic function of Tk, i.e. χk(t) = 1 if t ∈ Tk and
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